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II.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY

A. There was Insufficient Evidence to Prove Ms. Loveland had Knowledge that She

Possessed Methamphetamine or Believed She Possessed a Controlled Substance.

The state argues that the jury could have rationally found that Ms. Loveland
knew she possessed methamphetamine because she possessed a cut off straw and a
foil packet containing .21 grams of methamphetamine. Respondent’s Brief, p. 7.
But proof of possession by itself does not mean the possessor had knowledge of the
nature of the substance. That is why the Legislature only forbids possession with
knowledge.
Possibly due to this, the state attempts to supplement its argument by noting
that the aluminum foil was burnt. Id. But it does not point to any evidence that
Ms. Loveland knew the foil was burnt and the state’s Exhibit 1-A shows the burn
marks were on the inside of the packet.
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Even if there had been evidence that Ms. Loveland had ever seen the packet, she
could not have seen the burn marks without unwrapping it.
And the fact that Ms. Loveland possessed the straw is no proof of knowledge.
First because there was no evidence that she was aware of its potential use. And,
even if she were aware, she could have possessed the straw with the hope of
obtaining methamphetamine in the future rather than with the knowledge of
present possession.
As a fallback position, the state also argues that there is evidence Ms.
Loveland believed the foil packet contained marijuana. Respondent’s Brief, p. 8.
In doing so, it points to one item of testimony: “After Officer LeFave searched
Loveland’s pocket, he asked her what was in it. (Tr., p.139, Ls.2-8.) Loveland
responded, ‘Is it bud?’ (Tr., p.139, Ls.2-11.)” Id. This question, according to the
state, “strongly supports the inference that, at a minimum, Loveland believed she
was in possession of marijuana[.]” Id. It does not. The officer’s question, “What is
this?” (T p. 138, l. 7-12) referred to the foil packet. He was not asking because of
idle curiosity. He was making an implied accusation. She did not know what it was
and so made a guess. She knew it was something illegal because the officer would
not be asking the question if it were otherwise. This is like when a motorist is
pulled over by a traffic cop and is then asked, “How fast do you think you were
going?” The driver immediately knows they have been pulled over for speeding.
And, knowing that, the driver might hazard a guess above the speed limit (“81?”)
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even when they are unaware of their actual speed. That guess is not evidence that
the driver had knowledge of travelling any particular speed.
There was not substantial evidence upon which a trier of fact could have
found the knowledge element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, a
judgment of acquittal should enter. State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684 (2004).
B. The Court Abused its Discretion When it Denied the Motion to Continue.
The state’s argument that Ms. “Loveland cannot show that her substantial
rights were prejudiced” (Respondent’s Brief, p. 12) is without merit. She is not
required to make that showing to prevail.
The state cites to State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 21 (1999) and State v. Laws,
94 Idaho 200, 202 (1971), for the proposition that the appellant must demonstrate
that his substantial rights have been prejudiced by reason of a denial of his motion
to continue. Respondent’s Brief, p. 10. However, those cases were decided prior to

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). Under Perry, the appellant does not need
to show her substantial rights were violated by the denial of the motion to continue.
The state must prove the error in denying the motion was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. “A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionallybased error shall have the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which
point the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
The sole post-Perry case cited by the state does not cite to Perry for the
correct standard of review, instead citing to pre-Perry caselaw. State v. Herrera,
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152 Idaho 24, 30 (Ct. App. 2011), citing State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 736
(2010); State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 889 (Ct. App. 2006).
Notably, State v. Daly, 161 Idaho 925, 929 (2017), a post-Perry motion to
continue case, does not state that an appellant is required to show his substantial
rights were violated. The Daly Court, like Ms. Loveland, cited to Idaho’s wellestablished three-part abuse of discretion inquiry: “(1) whether the lower court
rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.” State v. Daly, 161 Idaho 925, 927–28, citing Schwan's Sales

Enters., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 142 Idaho 826, 831 (2006); compare Opening
Brief, p. 10 (citing Daly for appropriate standard of review).1
Indeed, the state also cites Daly for the proper abuse of discretion test. But it
fails to acknowledge Daly does not require that the appellant show her substantial
rights were prejudiced by the denial of her motion to continue to show an abuse of
discretion. Respondent’s Brief, p. 9-10.
In addition, Ms. Loveland’s substantial rights were prejudiced. Refusing to
continue the trial even though Ms. Loveland was ill from her pregnancy violated her
right “to appear and defend in person and with counsel” guaranteed by Article 1, §
13 of Idaho Constitution. While Ms. Loveland originally asked for permission to

While Daly also cites Laws, it does so only for the proposition that abuse of
discretion is the proper standard of review. Daly cites Schwan’s Sales for the abuse
of discretion test.
1
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voluntarily absent herself, she changed her mind after consulting with her attorney
and only decided to leave after the court denied her request for a continuance.
Thus, it is a mischaracterization to call Ms. Loveland’s choice to not attend the trial
while ill, after the court refused to continue, as an ”exercis[e of] her right not to be
present for the remainder of the trial.” Respondent’s Brief, p. 11. She did not feel
well enough to attend the trial, which proceeded notwithstanding her illness.
Had the motion to continue been granted, Ms. Loveland would have been able
to consult with her counsel during trial. She also would have been available to
testify in support of her defense of unknowing possession. As argued in the Opening
Brief, it is impossible to know the effect her testimony would have had on the jury’s
verdict and therefore the error cannot be found to be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Indeed, the state does not cite to or attempt to prove the error was harmless
under Perry.
The state writes that Ms. Loveland “ignores the actual basis of the district
court’s ruling” and that it did so “because continuing the trial after the jury was
empaneled would prejudice the state and result in ‘significant difficulties.’”
Respondent’s Brief, p. 12-13, citing Tr., p.113, Ls.5-14; p.114, Ls.2-10. But the court
said that it was “a significant difficulty” to continue “at this point[.]” T p. 113, l. 1012. The court did not say what that difficulty (singular) was, but the state claims
the “difficulties [were] due to the fact that the jury had already been empaneled
when the motion was made and that continuing the trial after the jury was
empaneled would prejudice the state.” Respondent’s Brief, p. 13. The state does not
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elaborate on how continuing the trial after empanelment caused any difficulties.
Nor does it say what prejudice it would have suffered.
There was no difficulty due to jeopardy having attached with the swearing of
the jury, as suggested by the state in a footnote. Respondent’s Brief, p. 12 n. 4. It is
well-established that the defendant’s motion for mistrial waives a later claim of
double jeopardy. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982). “Only where the
governmental conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving
for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial
after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.” See also, State v.

Pugsley, 128 Idaho 168, 174 (Ct. App. 1995) (“Pugsley waived his right to claim
protection under the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Idaho
Constitutions by moving for a mistrial. The prosecution and police did not
purposefully induce the mistrial and therefore did not implicate the protections of
the double jeopardy clauses.”).
And the state never argued below that delaying the trial would prejudice the
presentation of its case. It argued:
Frankly its distressing to me. It’s distressing from the standpoint of
preparation. It’s distressing from the standpoint of the time of the
Court and the time of the jury, and I would ask that we move forward
today.
T p. 112, l. 17-21. That is an argument that it would be inconvenient to the court,
jury, and the state to continue the trial. (Doubtless, Ms. Loveland’s illness was
inconvenient to her too.) It is not an argument that delay would prejudice the state
in its presentation of evidence.
6

In fact, the court denied the motion because Ms. Loveland did not seek a
continuance earlier that morning. But that is not a rational reason for denying the
motion for several reasons as set forth in the Opening Brief. In short, there is no
evidence that Ms. Loveland was aware that continuing the trial was even a
possibility when she first arrived. Moreover, the basis for the court’s ruling
illogically assumes that Ms. Loveland’s condition when she arrived was the same as
it was when jury selection was completed. Finally, the fact that Ms. Loveland did
not seek a continuance immediately shows it was not a ploy to avoid trial
altogether. The state does not address the merits of those arguments in its brief and
no reply is needed.
The court’s insistence on proceeding was the type of “unreasoning and
arbitrary insistence upon expedi tiousness in the face of justifiable request for delay”
which constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Daly, 161 Idaho at 929.
III.

CONCLUSION

There was insufficient evidence to prove that Ms. Loveland knew she
possessed methamphetamine or what she believed to be a controlled substance.
Thus, the judgment should be reversed and a judgment of acquittal should enter.
In addition, the court abused its discretion in not continuing the trial. The
remaining counts should be vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of June 2021.
/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Appellant
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